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Since coming to power in 1999, Morocco’s King Mohamed VI has strengthened 
his rule by reinforcing his father’s strategy of elite co-optation and  rotation. 
However, after two decades of economic predation, the gradual waning of 
rent-distribution channels, and the lack of genuine democratisation, the king’s 
 strategy of power consolidation may be running out of steam.
 • Mohamed VI’s rule has coincided with the adoption of large-scale neo-liberal 
reforms, which have created new opportunities for economic co-optation and 
strengthened the monarchy’s alliance with local economic and political elites. 
However, this neo-liberal turn has come with important costs for low-income 
groups. 
 • The last 20 years have been marked by an increase in the obedience of the local 
elite and the weakening of formal channels of political participation. The king 
has also been able to take credit for successful policies while simultaneously 
blaming the administration or elected officials for failed ones and contributing 
to the de-institutionalisation of the country’s politics. 
 • Increased inequality and an established culture of contempt towards the “losers” 
of liberalisation and privatisation policies mean that those dissatisfied with the 
regime will increasingly turn to coping mechanisms that have a direct impact on 
European security (e.g. drug and human trafficking, international terrorism, and 
violent political contestation).
Policy Implications
A stable and prosperous Morocco is vital to Europe’s security. However, inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth is only possible if genuine democratic reform 
allows for effective implementation of the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
and the development of robust democratic participatory channels through which 
popular grievances can be addressed.
   2    GIGA FocuS | MIddlE EAST | No. 3 | JuNE 2018 
Elite Co-Optation through Neo-Liberalism 
As with other authoritarian regimes, the Moroccan palace has long been aware that 
elite opposition rather than mass-based opposition represents the most  serious 
political danger. All three Moroccan kings who have ruled the country since inde-
pendence in 1956 have thus used two main instruments to pre-empt mobilisation: 
carefully timed policy concessions on the one hand, and the active co-optation of 
potential challengers on the other. While policy concessions have often been sym-
bolic and have never significantly weakened the king’s prerogatives, the Moroccan 
palace has been able to create a relationship of dependence with most of the coun-
try’s economic, political, and cultural elite – who have traded their loyalty for privi-
leged access to the state’s rent distribution channels.
While the logic of economic co-optation was a constant feature of Moroccan 
politics under Mohamed V (who rewarded loyalist rural elites with access to state 
rent channels in exchange for their support during his struggle with the nationalists) 
and later Hassan II (who used the same strategy to reward loyalist leftist  parties who 
supported his marginalisation of Islamic movements), King Mohamed VI currently 
benefits from a distinctive international economic context which has allowed him to 
expand the monarchy’s strategy of economic co-optation to unprecedented levels.
Whereas Mohamed V and Hassan II dispensed rent through relatively  limited chan-
nels (usually in the form of transportation, fishing, or mining licenses),  Mohamed VI 
has overseen large-scale neo-liberal reforms since 1999 – which have created new op-
portunities for economic co-optation – and strengthened the  monarchy’s alliance with 
the local economic and political elites. As noted by  Guazzone and Pioppi (2009: 6) 
and Boukhars (2011: 53), the adoption of neo-liberal policies in the form of priva-
tisation, liberalisation, and administrative deregulation and the concomitant re-
treat of the state from the delivery of public goods served a double function. on 
the one hand, it freed the authorities from the financial burden that came with the 
state’s former responsibilities. on the other, it increased the resilience of the state 
by helping produce a new generation of business elites dependent on the state for 
regulation, arbitration, and access to economic opportunities. Although the king 
and his close associates were the main beneficiaries of the neo-liberal turn of the 
1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, traditional supporters of the 
palace, loyalist families, and most of the country’s historical opposition members 
also witnessed a major improvement of their economic status. For Amal, a Moroccan 
academic, “large parts of the economic elite are in a win-win relationship with the 
palace, which is involved in a number of lucrative economic activities” (Amal, per-
sonal interview, 18 May 2017). These elite know that their mere proximity to the king 
will translate into added economic profits, even though a minority is also dissatisfied 
with what seems to be unfair competition from the monarchy in certain business 
activities such as banking or renewable energy. For Amal, the proximity to the palace 
is so economically rewarding that “nowadays, it is not the regime that seeks to co-opt 
people but rather, people that are trying to get co-opted” (Amal, personal interview, 
18 May 2017). Similarly, for Fouad Abdelmoumni, head of Transparency Morocco, 
the country’s economic elite are “a direct creation of the palace” (interview with 
F. Abdelmoumni, Rabat, 22 May 2017).
According to Ghassan Wael, a young Moroccan journalist, the “main mecha-
nism of co-optation and therefore of political resilience in the country is the use of 
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public policies to promote major public projects, such as electrification projects in 
the rural sector, real-estate development, or the automobile industry, who benefit 
from heavy state support” (interview with G. El Karmouni, Rabat, 18 May 2017) and 
whose profits are channelled by the palace and its associates. Under Mohamed VI, 
real estate and urban redevelopment – especially in the big cities of casablanca, 
Rabat, and Tangier – have become major conduits for the clientelist networks culti-
vated by the king and his associates. In particular, the privatisation of communally 
owned land unleashed an unprecedented process of capital accumulation for the 
regime’s clients. Additional mechanisms of economic co-optation include the priva-
tisation of state-owned enterprises subsequently purchased by some of the regime’s 
associates. The neo-liberal turn was so extensive that by 2008, 90 of the country’s 
biggest public companies were partially or fully privatised, with the most profitable 
ones privatised before 2005 (Maggi 2016: 103).
Bureaucratic duplicity between the administration and private actors is a 
com plementary win-win mechanism through which the resources of the state are 
mobilised to protect specific commercial enterprises usually labelled “national 
 champions” through fiscal and administrative exceptions and/or privileges. These 
so-called national champions are one of the numerous channels through which the 
alliance between the palace and some of the country’s economic elite is cemented. 
A case in point is the country’s Plan Vert project, an ambitious agricultural pro-
ject which is officially designed to re-energise the country’s agricultural sector. In 
 reality, some of the country’s best rural land was made available below market price 
to private actors (most close to the regime), who benefit from the government’s 
generous agricultural fiscal policies without being subject to any form of public 
oversight. Public–private partnerships in newly privatised activities such as waste 
collection or electricity provision are also being used to bolster local cronies who 
have been granted the most lucrative contracts in murky if not outright illegal con-
ditions. companies owned by these associates have often been allowed to operate 
without any supervision, all at the expense of users who were forced to pay more 
without any significant improvement in the quality of the services provided.
The symbiotic relationship between the economic elites and the authorities also 
stems from the deep dependence of the former on the latter and the relative vulner-
ability of Morocco’s big industrial groups to globalisation. Despite benefiting from 
the country’s liberalisation policies and often publicly supporting liberal policies, 
many of Morocco’s business elites are not able to survive without the  protectionist 
and regulative policies of the state (Benhaddou 2009: 112–115). In the gas sector, for 
instance, prices have been liberalised without concomitant state control, resul ting in 
the entire sector being managed by only 15 actors – one of whom, Aziz Akhannouch, 
controls roughly 30 percent of the market and is also the minister of agriculture, 
the head of the Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI, a loyalist politi-
cal party) and a personal friend of the king (interview with G. Wael, Rabat, 18 May 
2017). A study of the largest 344 Moroccan companies conducted by  oubenal and 
Zeroual in 2017 shows that, after the king and his family, the second-biggest benefi-
ciaries of the privatisation and liberalisation policies implemented in the country in 
the last three decades were 150 families close to the monarchy, the most important 
of which are also represented in government, as well as foreign investors (oubenal 
and Zeroual 2017: 137, 139, 154–155).
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While hitting lower-income groups the most, the neo-liberal turn also provided 
access to rent channels to new groups in the emerging middle class, whose support 
proved critical during the tumultuous first months of the Arab uprisings. Despite 
the important negative consequences of privatisation and deregulation policies on 
the general population, additional revenues allowed the regime to buy key consti-
tuencies (notably, trade unions and key groups in the public administration) during 
the first months of the Arab uprisings in 2011. According to a young former pro-
democracy activist, as a result, “most actions initiated by local actors failed because 
there was no support [from local actors] and ... no transmission belt between social 
demands and the country’s elite, who refused to legitimise popular demands” (in-
terview with Y. Rguig, Rabat, 20 May 2017). 
Even the country’s media is deeply embedded in this clientelistic logic. In their 
analysis of the main shareholders in the country’s media sector, Benchenna et al. 
(2017: 10–11) find that, with few exceptions, Moroccan media figures are members 
of either the regime or the local bourgeoisie, which has benefited from the economic 
and political liberalisation of the last 20 years. Examples of these actors include 
Fahd Yata, the son of Ali Yata (a former communist opposition leader and founder 
of one of the country’s main economic magazines); Moulay Hafid Elalamy, the cur-
rent industry and commerce minister; and Aziz Akhannouch, the current agricul-
ture minister – all of whom own some of the country’s most renowned publications 
(Benchenna et al. 2017: 10-11). “(F)or these businessmen, … investing in the press 
sector is intended to protect their own commercial interests, to support a stable po-
litical world by using their many titles in support of political communication, and to 
add business competence as one of the qualities required to become an established 
politician” (Benchenna et al. 2017: 10).
Double-Voiced Legitimacy 
Another characteristic of Mohamed VI’s power-consolidation strategy is his intense 
legitimacy-producing discourse in which he positions himself as the sole architect 
of most if not all of the county’s economic, social, and political achievements. The 
king is omnipresent in the country’s media coverage and constantly nourishes the 
impression that he is the only actor able to implement political reforms or deliver 
successful economic projects while blaming elected politicians and local adminis-
trators for any failures.
In the last two decades, for instance, the king has taken full credit for (i) reform-
ing the family code and thus improving women’s rights in the country, (ii) spear-
heading an ambitious equity and reconciliation committee, which officially turned 
the page on human rights abuses committed by his father, and (iii) implement-
ing an ambitious constitutional reform project designed to empower the country’s 
political institutions. At the economic level, the king has (a) led major infrastruc-
ture projects which helped quadruple the length of the country’s highway network, 
(b) removed the quasi-totality of Morocco’s urban slums, and (c) revitalised the 
core centres of the country’s major cities. The monarch has also been behind some 
of the country’s most popular socio-cultural projects, ranging from music festivals 
to religious celebrations.
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However, the king’s effort to produce legitimacy is a double-voiced exercise. 
While some efforts genuinely attempt to address some important domestic chal-
lenges such as sub-par housing or rural electrification, their other purpose is to 
strengthen the alliance between the king and his cronies through a systematic logic 
of economic transfer. In this perspective, the political and administrative reforms 
implemented over the last 15 years have had few positive effects beyond those as-
sociated with the regime; they have essentially targeted the country’s economic and 
political elite. Although they have created the impression of democratic reform, 
constitutional and administrative reforms have been used in practice to depoliticise 
and bureaucratise the king’s former opponents by rewarding them with attractive 
salaries and public status (interview with G. Wael, Rabat, 18 May 2017). This inten-
sive co-optation system is formalised partly through numerous instances of media-
tion created under royal impulse – notably, the Human Rights National council 
(cNdH), the council for Moroccans Residing Abroad (ccME), the Royal Advisory 
council for Saharan Affairs (coRcAS), the central Body for the Prevention of cor-
ruption (IcPc), and the High council for Education. These councils and commit-
tees are all presided over or staffed by established regime associates or former op-
ponents who accepted the offer to integrate themselves into the system and target 
specific constituents, such as women groups, Moroccans residing abroad, and tribal 
notables from the Sahara region who all share high mobilisation potential. Even 
though these institutions are rarely able to implement practical changes despite 
the hype that usually surrounds their creation, the process of elite co-optation and 
integration that occurs is very real and helps to neutralise vocal personalities such 
as driss Benzekri, a former political prisoner who was called to serve as head of the 
2004 Equity and Reconciliation commission. Another example is Salah El ouadie, 
a former political prisoner and far-leftist who served as spokesperson for the pro-
monarchy Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM). 
Another strategy used by the monarchy is the balancing of different administra-
tive, economic, and military interests against each other through elite arbitration. 
This practice serves a double function. on the one hand, it signals to the population 
that the monarch is genuinely concerned about political and economic reform and 
attentive to his subjects’ concerns. The king has thus adopted the habit of regu-
larly scolding administrators and elected officials for their lack of professionalism. 
 Mohamed VI has also accustomed the country to regular bouts of royal anger during 
which he punishes politicians or administrators deemed incompetent by removing 
them from office and appearing to take personal responsibility for the prompt ex-
ecution of specific projects. The palace also allows royal foundations, especially the 
Mohamed V Foundation for Solidarity and the Hassan II Fund for Economic and 
Social Solidarity, to benefit from significant public resources. Both of these institu-
tions are publicly funded, largely unaccountable to Parliament, and fall under the 
authority of either members of the king’s entourage or businesspersons from the 
private sector (catusse 2009: 78). While the funds are public, all the prestige of 
these organisations reverberates on the king, who does not allow others to appear 
as potential competitors.
on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the selective use of the jus-
tice system to rule on administrative corruption, nepotism, and conflicts of interests 
is a complementary mechanism through which the regime generates elite loyalty 
while giving the illusion of democratic and judicial reform. Random anti-corruption 
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campaigns strategically target actors deemed disloyal by the king and simultane-
ously allow him to bolster his role as the ultimate arbitrator of diverging political 
and economic interests. Transparency International ranks the country 90 out of 176 
(behind liberia, Zambia, and lesotho for instance) and regular scandals illustrate 
the prevalence of corruption at all levels of society but particularly in senior ad-
ministrative levels dependent on the monarchy. Examples of collusion include the 
allocation of public land below market price to regime associates and the accept-
ance of blatant conflicts of interest at all levels of business and administration. For 
Fouad Abdelmoumni, a Moroccan economist and general secretary of Transparency 
International’s Moroccan chapter, “corruption is not a marginal phenomenon ... It 
has been a deliberate choice to encourage criminal practices” (interview with F. Ab-
delmoumni, Rabat, 22 May 2018). 
Repression and “State Contempt”
The king’s strategy of elite rotation and rent-sharing has had important conse-
quences for the security configuration of the country. Given the unwillingness of 
most of the local political elites to challenge the king and extract policy concessions 
benefiting the majority, the palace can afford to ignore pressing societal grievances 
similar to those that led to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions in early 2011, 
despite disturbing signs of popular discontent. 
due to increased corruption levels, a surge in economic inequality (now the 
highest in North Africa), and growing administrative and political contempt to-
wards the victims of the country’s neo-liberal policies, among them well-educated 
youth, Morocco is witnessing increasingly aggressive episodes of political protest 
(up to 50 per day in 2014 according to one observer). Moreover, the  withdrawal of 
the state in what one journalist calls “useful Morocco” – where most of the state 
resources have been redeployed in the form of public–private partnerships for 
the benefit of the king and his  allies – explains why some of the country’s most 
persistent protests have occurred in  largely disregarded rural or semi-rural areas, 
such as the Rif region (2017 and 2018), the mining city of Jerada (2018), and small 
 periphery towns such as Sidi-Ifni, Zagora, Tinghir, or larache. 
The disconnect between the “winners” and “losers” of this economic and ad-
ministrative redeployment and the inability of the latter to generate real costs for 
the authorities allow the monarch and his associates to continue to dismiss  pressing 
societal demands. The regime can thus afford to punish critical journalists (most 
of whom are now in exile), put more limitations on freedom of association, jail 
 human rights activists, fire public servants deemed disloyal to the monarchy,  hijack 
the electoral process by appointing cronies to head client political parties, and en-
gage in political pursuits against public servants who report cases of corruption 
 involving associates of the king (interviews with K. Ryadi, Rabat, 19 May 2017 and 
F. Abdelmoumni, Rabat, 22 May 2017). The king, whose personal fortune has been 
said to amount to more than uSd 2.5 billion, can even afford to increase his per-
sonal budget to EuR 46 million (Elayoubi 2013), despite Morocco having a gross 
domestic product (GdP) per capita of a mere uSd 2,892 in 2016 (according to the 
World Bank). 
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Policy Implications for Europe
The sections above show that the privatisation of state-owned institutions, land, 
and culture – which has been camouflaged as “modernisation” or “economic re-
form” – constitutes the central mechanism facilitating the consolidation of the 
politico-economic pact between the monarchy and the elite at the expense of large 
parts of the population in Morocco. However, this mechanism, which allowed the 
monarchy to weather the turbulent first months of the 2011 Arab uprisings, con-
tains a number of contradictions which may not only affect the future of the country 
but also have important consequences for neighbouring Europe.
Although the neo-liberal turn occurred later in Morocco in comparison to other 
Arab countries, the transformation was much more extensive and costly at the so-
cial level (catusse 2009). The united Nations development Programme (uNdP) 
ranked Morocco 123 (out of 188) in 2015, which was behind Iraq (121), Palestine (114), 
Egypt (111), and Tunisia (97).
In the last decade Morocco has also been regionally underperforming in the areas 
of female literacy rates, rural development, and health. According to one former 
pro-democracy activist, “Everything is difficult in the capital city, but things are 
catastrophic outside of Rabat” (interview with Y. Rguig, Rabat, 22 May 2017). Ex-
ternal debt increased to 81 per cent of the country’s GdP in 2014 from an average of 
50.4 per cent during the five years (2007–2012) preceding the Arab uprisings. This 
equates to every Moroccan paying approximately uSd 500 annually to service the 
national debt (Aziki 2015), which is used in part to finance rent-distribution mecha-
nisms (ibid). Against this background, it is no surprise that the first two countries 
affected by the 2011 Arab uprisings – namely, Tunisia and Egypt – were also the 
most diligent in implementing neo-liberal policies in the 1990s and the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. In the case of Morocco, the alliance between the local 
elites and the monarchy means that a social revolution is still unlikely. However, 
increased inequality and an established culture of contempt towards the “losers” of 
the liberalisation and privatisation policies introduced in the last two decades mean 
that those dissatisfied with the regime will increasingly resort to one or more of the 
following three coping mechanisms: the informal economy, populism, or violent 
horizontal contestation.
Figure 1.
Comparative Human 
Development Index: 
North Africa
Source: (UNDP 2018) 
available at: http://hdr.
undp.org/en/data  
(23 March 2018)
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The informal economy accounts for more than 14 per cent of Morocco’s GdP 
(cFcIM 2014) and allows millions of Moroccans to carve out a space for  economic 
production partially free from state predation. However, large segments of the popu-
lation are becoming increasingly involved in illegal activities, ranging from sex work 
to drug trafficking to money laundering. Morocco was traditionally an exporter of 
cannabis but is fast becoming a major transit hub for cocaine, heroin, and synthetic 
drugs from latin America directed at the European market. Since 2013, for instance, 
drug seizures have increased in all categories (Médias24 2017), with more than 
2.8 tonnes of cocaine seized in one year in Casablanca alone. Drug traffickers are 
using established export routes originating from regions long neglected by the state, 
such as northern Rif and the eastern border area in oriental, to diversify their smug-
gling activities, be they new drugs or weapons or illegal migrants (Sidiguitebe 2014).
The growing popular dissatisfaction with the country’s representative institu-
tions combined with the above-noted contempt towards the losers of economic re-
form is increasing polarisation between the haves and the have nots and  leading to 
a political environment which threatens foreign investments. A case in point is a 
commercial boycott campaign launched online in May 2018 by a number of digital 
activists who singled-out three companies accused of setting prices out of reach for 
the majority of the population. Instead of seeing the boycott campaign as a warn-
ing sign from citizens upset at the growing economic inequality in the country, the 
representatives of the private companies targeted by the boycott and members of 
the government chose instead to snub boycotters, with one representative from 
centrale danone, one of the companies targeted by boycotters, calling the latter 
 “traitors” and a government minister disdainfully referring to them as “dummies.” 
The distance between the regime and large parts of the population is also reflected 
in the irrational tone of some local conspiracy theories, which argue that the au-
thorities’ relatively welcoming strategy vis-à-vis sub-Saharan migrants is a “ploy 
destined to recruit non-Moroccans in order to better repress the popular mobilisa-
tion to come” (anonymous, personal interview, January 2018).
In the last 10 years, the regime has also made heavy use of popular online news 
portals to delegitimise and defame all those who advocate for meaningful reform 
and threaten the supremacy of the palace. The popularity of local figures completely 
removed from formal institutions, such as Nasser Zefzafi, an undereducated former 
nightclub bouncer who was the leader of the 2017 Rif protests, illustrates the au-
thorities’ success in delegitimising institutional alternatives. Should the country ex-
perience uprisings similar to those that occurred in neighbouring Tunisia or Egypt, 
a peaceful transition would be difficult given the absence of legitimate representa-
tive figures who are able to channel and address popular demands. 
From a European perspective, it is therefore vital to recognise that the failure of 
the Moroccan reform model entails important risks of direct relevance to European 
security. Instead of lauding the cosmetic reforms of the Moroccan regime, the Eu 
should pressure the monarchy to adopt reforms that genuinely strengthen the rule 
of law and human rights and facilitate inclusive economic growth.
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